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JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS: A COOPERATIVE
EFFORT
RONALD W. EADES*
Federal judicial nominations, especially those to the United
States Supreme Court, attract substantial attention and debate.'
When a President of the United States, who has the apparent
backing of a large portion of the United States population, makes
a selection for the highest court in the land, there are those who
believe that the President's decision should not be "second
guessed." This is especially true in today's society, where the Pres-
ident is of one political party and the other political party holds
substantial sway in the body doing the "second guessing." It may
be suggested that the duly elected, and substantially respected, re-
publican President should not have to deal with confrontational
Democratic party Senators. The President's nominations, how-
ever, must and will have to deal with the Senators. There are, in
fact, two reasons why that confrontation will occur. First, and eas-
ier to explain, the Constitution requires that the nominations be
submitted to the Senate for approval. Although more difficult to
explain, and less likely to be universally accepted, the second rea-
son is more important than the first. The second reason is that it
is good for this nation that the Constitution requires that the
nominations be submitted to the Senate for approval.
The Constitution of the United States does require that judicial
nominations be approved by the Senate.2 The use of the power to
give "advice and consent" has been used in varying degrees by
that legislative body throughout the history of the United States.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Drafters of the Constitution
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Louisville. B.A., Rhodes College; J.D.,
Memphis State University; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
The manuscript for this article was written prior to the final weekend hearings on
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. Thinking people in the legal profession may want to
consider for some time whether those three days of hearings and the final confirmation
vote tend to support or discredit the arguments presented here.
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 7: 93, 1991
could have assumed that the Senate would merely approve all
nominations without any review. Surely the "advice and consent"
authority was intended to have some meaning. In order to carry
out this function properly, the Senate must conduct a review of
the nominee being offered. It may be suggested, however, that
throughout the nation's history, the Senate has routinely ap-
proved such nominations. This argument usually indicates that
the complete investigations and comprehensive reviews are merely
a modern innovation of the Senate. If the past practice of the Sen-
ate was to approve nominees without review, then the Senate
failed in one of its constitutionally mandated responsibilities. In
order to perform duties of office fully, Senators must investigate
and carefully review nominees.
The second reason for complete review of judicial nominations
may not be acceptable to some. It is good for the overall structure
of this nation that judicial candidates must receive the approval of
the Senate. The Senate provides a forum that is necessary due to
the nature of things: the nature of humans, politics, and the
courts.
Human nature should come as no surprise to anyone, but yet it
constantly produces results that amaze all. A seat on the federal
judiciary, especially one on the Supreme Court of the United
States, is a lifetime plum that would excite any professional in the
law. If given the opportunity, every such professional would exer-
cise that role, at least, for a limited period of time. It is only with
a hint of cynicism that the populace must admit that the nation
needs to be careful of anyone who would want a job that much.
Although it is difficult to admit, not every legal professional is
honest, brilliant, willing to uphold the ideals of the Constitution,
and dedicated to the traditions that have made the United States
strong. These traits would surely be recognized as minimum stan-
dards for federal judicial officers, but not all legal professionals
possess them. A person who desired the job could well be willing
to hide a few flaws in an effort to pick the plum of the legal call-
ing. One might well ask: "If the judicial nominee has nothing to
hide, why would the nominee wish to hide it?"
There have been just enough examples of embarrassing public
disclosures after nominees have agreed to have their Senate hear-
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ings, to feel that the Senate hearings must be held. Many people
with flaws in their past would probably decline the opportunity to
have those flaws spread over the front pages of the major newspa-
pers. That could easily be done by declining the nomination itself.
This is where, however, human nature arises. There are those
with flaws in their lives, or maybe just ineptness publicly proven,
who will nonetheless agree to public interrogation. When this oc-
curs, the display runs its course and the nominee is rejected. If
offered the opportunity for a Supreme Court seat with no concern
over public scrutiny, however, all manner of the dishonest and the
inept would be willing to gain the seat. Unfortunate as human na-
ture is, in order to maintain high standards for the federal judici-
ary, the fear of public scrutiny must remain a constant in the se-
lection process. The investigatory process can remove the
unqualified. In addition, the public scrutiny that actually occurs
must remain sufficiently arduous to insure that the level of fear
among the unqualified remains high enough so that they do not
even take the chance of accepting nomination for such a high
position.
The nature of politics is not unlike the nature of humans. It is a
civics class cliche that our government is a balance of powers.
Each branch serves special functions while limiting the power of
the other branches. Each branch also has varying degrees of ac-
countability to the population as a whole. That is reflected by the
range of accountability between the House of Representatives and
the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives is highly ac-
countable, since its members stand for re-election every two years.
In contrast, the Supreme Court is less accountable, as Justices en-
joy lifetime tenure. Senatorial accountability seems at a medium
level because of the six-year terms. The vague presidential ac-
countability is, of course, an amazing feature of the Constitution
with election through electors and the ability to hold only two
four-year terms. Each of the branches of government and the vot-
ers who placed them in office, have differing goals and world
views. Each is seeking to represent a constituency that has imme-
diate desires that may not always be reflective of long-term bene-
fits. The Supreme Court, with the least accountability and longest
term, must, by the nature of our government, reflect the long-
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term interests of the nation. Consequently, the appointment pro-
cess of the Supreme Court-and to a lesser extent the lower fed-
eral judiciary-must be immune from daily crisis.
If the President of the United States were allowed to select the
members of the federal judiciary without any outside scrutiny, the
maintenance of the long-term good served by the courts would be
lost. This is not to say that the office of President is so devious
that it cannot be trusted. It is just to recognize that the office of
President is held by a person who must be expected to act as a
human. In fact, if any single person, or single body in govern-
ment, were allowed to select the federal judiciary without outside
scrutiny, long-term goals would be lost.
The President, for example, has a particular agenda. The Presi-
dent feels, one may assume, that an agenda keeping withthe ide-
als of the Constitution, is good for the general population, and
will continue the strength of the United States. It is, however, an
agenda that reflects a popular political campaign with some de-
gree of accountability to the voters. The history of the world, to
say nothing of the history of the United States, reflects numerous
popular ideas that flourished in one decade only to be thoroughly
renounced in the next. If a popular President were allowed to
pack the judiciary in a manner unchecked by outside review, a
stagnation of the country could occur. As the nation moved for-
ward by renouncing old agendas, it would be saddled with a judi-
ciary unable to move. A second body of government reviewing
the selection process may help prevent such a disaster. This is es-
pecially true when that body may be dominated by an opposing
political party. The Senate may be expected to investigate fully
every nomination and make the nominee stand the test of public
scrutiny with hopes that the ultimate judicial officer can stand the
test of time.
It may, at times, be suggested that the Senate is seeking to
thwart the will of the majority by confronting the choices of a
popular President. This overlooks the fact that the Senators are
themselves popularly elected officials. They may be of a different
political party, and representatives of different collections of peo-
ple, but they are democratically elected officers. Many of them, in
fact, may be more popular to their constituencies than the popu-
Vol. 7: 93, 1991
Judicial Nominations
lar President is to his.
It may also be claimed that some of the individual Senators are
not worthy to challenge the nominees. It may be claimed that
since these Senators have sufficient flaws of their own, they should
remain silent. This claim also overlooks the nature of the election
process. The Senators, as does the President, stand for election in
the states. The voters of those states have listened to campaigns
and have had the opportunity to become aware of all flaws in
their elected officials. Those voters, however, have determined
that, among their choices, the person they elect as Senator is to
serve them in Washington. Should they decide that the Senator is
no longer competent to serve, the voters will tell the Senator
when it is time to stay home.
Everyone who ever served on a committee has either heard or
made jokes about the committee process.' That process is fre-
quently long, tiring, and subject to compromise. The political pro-
cess in the United States is a committee process. Decisions are not
made by one person; decisions are made through layers of repre-
sentatives. It may be said, only partly sarcastically, this is why we
call our government a democracy rather than a tyranny. It can be
frustrating for the populace to see a popular President select a
popular judicial nominee only to have the process bogged down
for weeks in long, tiring hearings. This is, however, the nature of
our politics. This process allows the political system to bring all
ideas into focus and to bear on the important decision of judicial
selection. It may be frustrating, but it is necessary to retain the
balance of power within this nation.
The nature of the judiciary itself may be the strongest reason
for substantial review of judicial nominees. The federal judiciary,
especially the United States Supreme Court, holds a unique posi-
tion in our form of government. The power of any one legislator
is diluted by the fact that there are so many of them. The power
of the executive is filtered through the political process which re-
quires that the President receive the approval of numerous people
before being placed into office. The members of the judiciary
have neither of these criteria for authority. One Supreme Court
3 A camel is a horse put together by committee.
Journal of Legal Commentary
Justice, on a closely divided Court, however, can hold great
power. In addition, that one Justice may emerge from a dimly lit
past to great prominence with little known about that past. The
hearing process is necessary to insure at least three criteria. First,
the country needs a jurist to be a competent legal mind and not a
neophyte to grand issues. The jurist should be committed to great
ideals and not tied to some passing fancy. Finally, it is necessary
for the jurist to be a sufficiently learned scholar to be able to write
persuasive prose.
It is an accepted assumption that the country needs competent
members of the federal judiciary. No law firm in the country
would ever consider sending a neophyte, new associate to argue a
case before the United States Supreme Court. As a nation, we
should not send neophyte legal minds to decide those major cases.
It must be realized that, merely because a lawyer has been in prac-
tice for a while and has caught the attention of the American
politicos, does not mean that the lawyer is a competent legal
mind. The United States Supreme Court routinely decides major
issues of constitutional law which have an impact on civil and
human rights in this country. The Supreme Court should be
populated by people who understand those rights.
An interesting example to consider is Justice William 0. Doug-
las and freedom of religion. In 1947, Justice Douglas joined with
a majority that approved public expenditures for bus rides to
church-sponsored schools.' In 1951, he wrote the majority opin-
ion that allowed school release time from public school for reli-
gious instruction. 5 That opinion contained the memorable phrase,
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being."' By 1970, however, Justice Douglas dissented to a
case which approved tax exemption for churches. In his dissent,
he indicated that his vote with the majority in the 1947 case was
probably wrong.' In the twenty-year span between 1951 and
1970, Justice Douglas participated in numerous decisions con-
cerning freedom of religion. Legal scholars and historians would
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
' Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-15 (1952).
6 Id. at 313.
' Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 703 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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delight in reading those opinions to watch the growth and pro-
gress of the mind of a public figure on an important issue. As a
nation, however, the average citizen should be horrified to find
out that a Supreme Court Justice was trying to gain an education
while writing the law of the land.
During the hearings for a member of the federal judiciary, com-
mittee members may want to avoid asking for an opinion on a
specific case. Nevertheless, the hearings should test the nominee's
competence on major issues courts could expect to consider.8 One
can well imagine that the Supreme Court will consider abortion
decisions in the coming years. The abortion decisions are re-
ported at great length in the news media. Legal journals discuss
and dissect the right of privacy as it relates to abortion through
thousands of pages. Average citizens have drawn lines and pub-
licly demonstrate to express their views on this issue. One could
expect that a nominee for high office should have read, studied,
thought and formed opinions about the basic issues concerning
this matter. For a nominee to appear to have no opinion on this
matter should be considered prima facie evidence of incompe-
tence. Abortion, for that matter, should be just one of the major
issues that competent legal minds consider. Freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, federalism, neo-states' rights, and rights of
the criminally accused, are just some of the major issues that fed-
eral courts will have to decide. The nation should demand that
competent legal minds decide these issues.
If the nominee is competent, the nation should demand that fu-
ture jurists be committed to enduring ideals. With just a little
luck, the Constitution may endure forever. Although one should
not expect any Supreme Court decision to remain valid for such
an extended period of time, the nation does have to live with bad
decisions for a long time. Frequently, what becomes viewed as a
bad decision was a decision which appeared correct at the time it
was decided. To pick just two examples-freedom of speech suf-
' An interesting example from a lower federal judge can be found in Wallace v. Jaffee,
472 U.S. 38, 48 (1985). That decision resulted from a federal district court judge who
apparently believed that the "'[f]ederal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's es-
tablishment of a state religion." Id.
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fered when the Supreme Court allowed Eugene Debs9 to remain
in jail, and human rights were denied with the Dred Scott deci-
sion. 10 These two opinions, however, were in keeping with the
views and, unfortunately, passions of the time. Legislators are
elected to represent the current will of the majority. The execu-
tive is elected to push a popular agenda. When the United States
Supreme Court follows a current fad, the nation suffers. The his-
tory of the greatness of this nation will not be based upon slavery,
internment of Japanese-Americans, Communist black lists, or
other equally grotesque features of American life. Those once-
popular ideals are dark pages in our past. The greatness of the
nation is its underlying belief in human rights. By offering a home
to the poor, hungry, and suppressed of the world, the United
States supports the highest ideals of human development. When
the popular will, and that will's elected representatives, stray into
some fad, the judiciary is the body that must retain the spark of
greatness for the nation. Hearings for judicial nominees must in-
quire into the commitment to human rights and the free human
spirit.
It may appear trite to suggest that a nominee must exhibit writ-
ing skills. Writing skills, however, underlie every other strength of
the courts. The legislature represents the will of the majority and
controls the purse strings. The majority can hold the legislature
immediately accountable, while enjoying taxes, or economic bene-
fits. The executive commands vast armies of soldiers and vast ar-
mies of bureaucrats. The soldiers stand ready to put down rebel-
lion, while the bureaucrats control daily lives. The judiciary,
however, has no real power. While the judiciary is constantly put
in the position of having to tell the majority of the population that
the majority's will is unconstitutional, the judiciary has no way to
effectuate its view except through persuasion. When, for example,
the United States Supreme Court wants to move the legislature,
the executive, and the general population, the only way the Court
can accomplish its goal is through the power of the written word.
The written word, therefore, must accomplish two goals in
' Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
10 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 392, 452-54 (1857).
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every crisis. The language must be sufficiently clear and convinc-
ing to legitimize the Court's decision. The general population
must feel that although it disagrees with the Court, the words of
the Court are the law of the land. In a sense, the words must be-
come politically sacred. Second, the words must be sufficiently ele-
gant and eloquent to inspire the nation. When the United States
Supreme Court strikes down legislation as unconstitutional, the
words of the opinion move the country as a whole to a higher
ideal. The nation must not only accept the opinion as the law of
the land, but should also be persuaded to move toward concern
for the greater rights involved. Several examples may be helpful
to illustrate this issue.
While Justice Douglas was trying to decide where he stood on
freedom of religion, Justice Black wrote a dissent to the school
release time case. Justice Black said:
Under our system of religious freedom, people have gone to
their religious sanctuaries not because they feared the law
but because they loved their God. The choice of all has been
as free as the c oice of those who answered the call to wor-
ship moved only by the music of the old Sunday morning
church bells. The spiritual mind of man has thus been free to
believe, disbelieve, or doubt, without re Pression, great or
small, by the heavy hand of government.'
The wavering of Justice Douglas is not persuasive. The use, how-
ever, of powerful images by Justice Black makes his opinion
strong.
In the area of free speech, another example can be seen in Jus-
tice Holmes's dissent to one of the first World War speech cases:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fight-
ing faiths, they may come to believe even more than they be-
lieve the very foundations of their own conduct that the ulti-
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out."
" Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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When Chief Justice Rehnquist wanted to dissent to the flag burn-
ing cases, he quoted the entire John Greenleaf Whittier poem,
Barbara Frietchie."3 Although Barbara Frietchie is a delightful poem
and enjoyed by children throughout the United States, the "Mar-
ket Place of Ideas" that was created by Justice Holmes is an image
that will last as long as this nation endures. Respect for the court
system is based upon the ability of the opinions to instill that re-
spect. That respect can only be instilled by language that touches
ideas, images, and emotions deep within each citizen.
With so many important criteria to consider, the hearing pro-
cess may be almost too abbreviated to cover its mission. No law
firm would advance a junior associate without watching some
years of work, writing, and skill development. No law school
would tenure a professor without requiring that the professor do
substantial writing to develop and express ideas. The Senators,
during hearings for judicial nominees however, seem content at
times, to accept candidates with little experience and no written
expression of their positions. The best evidence of a nominee's.
competence, ideals, and skills would lie in written work. When the
nominee has written in legal journals or court opinions, those
ideas had to be considered, refined, and expressed in a competent
manner. Those ideas would then be available for subsequent re-
view by the nominee to re-affirm, further develop, or reject. The
nation as a whole could then consider these works in reviewing
the nominees for judicial office. To allow a nominee to occupy
such a position without such evidence seems remiss. To allow a
nominee to occupy the position of Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court without extensive forms of such evidence should be
unthinkable.
In summary, selection to the federal judiciary, especially the
United States Supreme Court, should be a time-consuming pro-
cess. We do not want Justices of the Supreme Court subject to the
will of the majority to the extent that they must be accountable
every two years for another election. We have a House of Repre-
13 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a won-
derful presentation of Barbara Frietchie, consult J. THURBER, THE THURBER CARNIVAL
(1931). In this work, James Thurber provided a series of drawings to help illustrate the
poem.
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sentatives to serve that function, and it is not one that we want
served too often. By standing for election every two years, the
candidates must be subject to testing on every current whim or
fancy of the public at large. In times of crisis, frequently elected
officials may find themselves appealing to the base instincts of vot-
ers. This appeal may take the form of claiming they are protect-
ing some security of the voters when, in fact, it may be the secur-
ity of the job of the elected official that is at stake. This nation
does not need and could not long tolerate a judiciary that ap-
pealed to base instincts. Federal judges are appointed for life and
must seek to bring continuity to the grand experiment that is the
United States. Justices on the Supreme Court write the traditions
that become the law of the land, and they must stand for higher
ideals. Those Justices must reflect the hopes of the "American
Dream" while standing above the daily strife. If nominees wish to
be a part of that tradition, they must be ready to endure scrutiny
of the details of their lives. It is only through this detailed, con-
frontational and sometimes troubling process that the nation may
be assured that each new member of the federal judiciary will
meet the standards set by the jurists of the past.
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